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The natural gas utility fires and explosions 
that occurred 25 miles north of Boston 
on September 13, 2018, are tragic and 
perhaps unprecedented. While preliminary 
investigative reports indicate over-
pressurized gas lines as the cause of 
the disaster, further examination by the 
National Transportation Safety Board, 
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA), and 
other authorities will determine the root 
cause and contributing factors. Although 
PHMSA has delegated its authority for the 
regulation of intrastate pipeline facilities to 
the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Utilities, PHMSA is ultimately responsible 
for issuing and enforcing minimum safety 
regulations for interstate and intrastate 
pipelines. From an administrative 
perspective, is there a more systematic 
method of oversight that will better assess 
organizational and operational hazards and 
risk, and place the agency at the forefront 
of operational excellence? The Boston 
event reveals tangential opportunities 
for PHMSA to reassess and remodel 
strategic enterprise operations that ensure 
continuous improvement and sustainability 
in business practices, regulation review 
and development, collaboration across the 
agency, and transparency through President 
Donald Trump’s administration and every 
administration moving forward. Irrespective 
of who is in office, PHMSA’s core mission 
remains constant—safety. 
 An agency under the U.S. Department 
of Transportation (DOT), PHMSA has the 
jurisdiction over the safe transportation of 
hazardous materials and energy products in 
all modes of transport, including pipelines. 
PHMSA executes its mission through two 
primary safety programs: the Office of 
Pipeline Safety (OPS) and the Office of 
Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS). While 
each program office has distinct statutory 
authorities and two separate budgets, 
there are natural intersections in the day-
to-day operations as well as priorities and 
initiatives originating from the White House, 
the Secretary of Transportation, Congress, 
and other key entities. This divergence can 
trigger gaps in communication, distinct and 
conflicting initiatives, and uncoordinated 
and separate policies and processes for 
rulemaking; regulatory review; employee 
training; research and development; 
outreach and engagement; grant solicitation 
and funding; data collection, analysis, and 
maintenance; and how the agency responds 
to audits from external parties. 
 An incident such as the one that 
occurred outside of Boston may catalyze 
PHMSA to reconfigure the agency-
wide accident investigation resourcing 
and processes, something the new 
administrator, Howard "Skip" Elliott, has 
been working toward since taking office. In 
fact, nearly every prior administrator has 
attempted this unsuccessfully. Shortly after 
the administrator was sworn in, he unveiled 
his vision and priorities. Among the changes 
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create and maintain governance uniformity 
is critical when attempting to carry out 
one mission and a shared vision across 
both program offices. When processes are 
not coordinated, consistent, documented, 
current, or transparent up, down, and 
across the organization, it renders internal 
communications, executive notifications, 
and reporting convoluted and difficult to 
navigate, especially during the initial stages 
of an incident or other significant event. This 
puts the agency at risk, particularly during 
time-sensitive emergencies when well-
organized, expedited action and reliable and 
current information are critical for reporting 
up the chain of command and to the public. 
This process deficiency also diminishes the 
effectiveness and efficiency of training and 
onboarding new employees. 
 Surprisingly, the accident investigation 
program is not an anomaly. Many processes 
within PHMSA are not standardized or 
documented, and those that are lack a 
centrally located common repository, as 
noted in separate audits by the Office of 
Inspector General,1 DOT’s oversight division 
that investigates the performance and 
integrity of the agency, and the Government 
Accountability Office,2 an independent, 
nonpartisan agency that investigates how 
the federal government spends taxpayer 
dollars on behalf of Congress. Within OHMS, 
voluntary efforts have recently been made 
in the data operations division to establish 
a quality management system (QMS) that 
will situate the office on a path to achieving 
continuous organizational improvement, 
comprising elements such as business 
metrics and documented SOPs.3 But this 
effort is nascent for OHMS, the concept is 
not fully embraced throughout the agency, 
and it lacks consistently dedicated funding 
to sustain the initiative. Historically, the 
entire agency has had challenges instituting 
QMS principles at the employee, program, 
and organization levels. It is impossible to 
evaluate performance and gauge whether or 
not a program or agency is meeting targets 
if baselines are not established and relevant 
quantifiable metrics and key performance 
indicators are not identified—you can’t 
improve what you don’t measure. This 
fundamental gap and the glaring lack of 
was restructuring and unifying the accident 
investigation process in which each program 
office (OHMS and OPS) would leverage 
each other’s resources and expertise—a 
one-PHMSA approach that is diametrically 
opposed to the segregated pathways of the 
current program. Presently, each program 
has a dedicated accident investigation team 
and separate processes, which theoretically 
is reasonable as hazmat and pipeline safety 
retain their own statutory authorities 
and are separately funded. However, this 
fundamental separation in authorities 
and budget between OHMS and OPS has 
inevitably led to disparate operational 
management, business practices, and 
policies across PHMSA. 
 For OHMS, accident investigation is 
essentially collateral duty in each of the 
five U.S. regional offices. Some field offices 
may have their own separately created 
process, but there is no single, OHMS-
wide standardized operating procedure 
(SOP) across the field offices for how and 
when to respond; how to coordinate and 
communicate within PHMSA and with other 
federal and state agencies; what data to 
collect; how to curate and maintain data; 
how to systematically evaluate data for 
trend analysis and forecasting; how to 
communicate data; or who is ultimately 
responsible for overall collection, analysis, 
and tracking on behalf of OHMS headquarters 
and field offices. Conversely, OPS has a 
dedicated accident investigation team in 
their field operations group. Perhaps a one-
PHMSA approach would help foster unity and 
collaboration in the areas where it makes 
sense to administratively coordinate, such 
as training capacity, proficiency building, 
agency process development, and shared 
services. Despite safety being the common 
denominator between OHMS and OPS, 
the most significant undertaking will be 
metamorphosing the segregated business 
culture that has been historically embedded 
in the agency from the top-down. 
 The singular vision and mission of PHMSA 
represents both program offices (after all, 
it is one agency), thus natural synergies 
and alliances exist between enterprise 
priorities, agency-wide resources, and 
organizational functionalities. The need to 
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3SOPs are the most striking weaknesses of 
PHMSA. Not requiring SOPs or instituting 
a performance management system 
that focuses on the performance of the 
organization, programs, and employees 
inhibits the agency from truly becoming 
a proactive, innovative, and data-driven 
organization, something they have been 
striving to achieve for years, as noted in the 
current and prior strategic plans.
 The previous administration attempted 
to implement a number of changes to its 
organizational structure to improve business 
operations and accountability but fell short 
on execution. One of those changes was 
establishing a nonpolitical career executive 
director and amalgamating that position with 
the role of chief safety officer (CSO), formerly 
a standalone career executive position. A CSO 
is a significant position that has extensive 
responsibility to create safety policies, ensure 
implementation, research and analyze all 
departments/divisions to confirm alignment 
with agency safety policies, and ensure 
that each faction within the organization is 
meeting its safety targets by holding those 
program offices accountable. Safety-related 
data tend to reside within different groups, in 
this case between OHMS and OPS. Each office 
has different priorities, goals, and milestones 
and reports data to the administrator 
through separate associate administrators. 
A CSO should have the dedicated authority 
to ensure timely, accurate, and company-
wide safety reporting that bridges functional 
and corporate silos to discover and address 
safety issues long before incidents occur. The 
CSO role should have independent “global” 
responsibilities and act as the sole point of 
contact within PHMSA, as adverse events are 
not limited by program offices, particularly 
if the vision is attaining a one-PHMSA 
framework and the core mission is safety. 
Thus, to maximize safety outcomes, this 
role would be best served as a standalone, 
full-time career position, not one that is 
camouflaged and diluted with the duties of an 
executive director whose all-encompassing 
job is laden with oversight in executive 
notification reports, operational planning 
and management, human resources, legal 
matters, financial planning, community 
relations, and overseeing consistency and 
continuity of business operations during 
administration transitions.
 Another modification the prior 
administration instituted was the 
establishment of a new crosscutting office, 
the Office of Planning and Analytics (OPA), 
to improve enterprise strategic planning 
and performance, develop a data-driven 
regulatory agenda, enhance market 
intelligence and data analysis, and drive 
consistency in how PHMSA collects and 
uses data. However, when this office was 
approved by Congress and established by 
the last administration, job descriptions 
delineating roles and responsibilities were 
not created, leaving new hires without clear 
direction, duties, or boundaries. Much of 
the work was duplicative and redundant of 
current programmatic functions, which failed 
to assess the overarching picture, focusing 
chiefly on program operations as opposed 
to a corporate perspective. This approach 
is contradictory to the principles of public 
service and out of step with the Trump 
administration’s desire to reduce bureaucracy 
and eliminate redundancy within the federal 
government. From a practical perspective, 
having a singular sector within the agency 
that has chief responsibility for agency-
wide strategic performance, planning, and 
prioritization; data, strategy, and analytics; 
and organizational economic research and 
forecasting is incredibly valuable. However, 
without an initial needs assessment and 
implementation and communication plan, 
execution will be fragmented and buy-in 
challenging to achieve. 
 Although there have been noticeable 
improvements overseeing and instituting 
a unified agency regulatory reform agenda 
consistent with President Trump’s Executive 
Order 13777 on “Enforcing the Regulatory 
Reform Agenda,”4 complications remain in 
defining the scope and ownership within OPA 
and how this new office intersects with and 
coordinates and compliments OHMS and OPS 
roles and responsibilities. As the agency’s 
primary office for planning and program 
management, and with the well-recognized 
deficiency in agency data management 
and quality, metrics, and processes, 
perhaps a future goal for PHMSA and OPA 
to consider is to work toward an integrated 
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a benefit that will undoubtedly extend to 
safeguarding the public.
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management system that assimilates all 
systems and processes into one complete 
and comprehensive package, including safety 
management systems (SMS), environmental 
management systems (EMS), and QMS. This 
will truly enable the agency to function as 
a single unit with unified objectives. In the 
meantime, the agency still has to expand 
QMS principles outside of just one division 
within OHMS, operationalize and interlace 
SMS throughout the agency’s safety culture 
(a goal that has been slow to materialize 
since it first appeared in PHMSA’s strategic 
plan in the early 2000s), and even begin 
to conceptualize an EMS framework. Too 
often, organizations focus on management 
systems independently, if at all, and 
compartmentalize each of these platforms, 
resulting in absent, underdeveloped, or 
patchy business operations and gross overlap 
and incongruities.
 Following the Boston event, U.S. 
Senators Ed Markey and Elizabeth Warren 
requested that the Senate Commerce 
Committee schedule a hearing on the 
incident to explore whether regulators 
have adequate authority and resources 
to identify and resolve violations and to 
respond to incidents in a timely manner. 
Pipeline transportation is one of the safest 
and most cost-effective ways to transport 
natural gas and hazardous liquid products. 
As the scope and complexity of PHMSA’s 
safety mission continue to grow and evolve 
and the U.S. continues to develop and place 
more demands on energy transportation, it 
becomes imperative to invest in upgrading 
its infrastructure, including aging pipelines, 
and to evaluate the comprehensiveness 
and effectiveness of current regulations. 
The Boston event along with the expanding 
energy market may also be the impetuses 
PHMSA needs to reconsider its optimal 
organizational configuration for the most 
effective and efficient use of resources that 
prompts the agency to improve safety, not 
only for our aging pipelines, but for the 
entire transportation and infrastructure 
network. This will allow the agency to unify 
and modernize processes, technologies, and 
regulations and to track performance at 
the program and agency levels, which will 
ultimately result in corporate efficiencies, 
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